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3. Ehman has no property in Utah, does not maintain 
any agents, employees, offices, bank accounts, or physical 
facilities in Utah. (Affidavit of Ehman, R- 16) 
4. Ehman allegedly entered into an oral contract with 
Plastic World to have a mold used to manufacture plastic parts 
repaired by Plastic World in Salt Lake City, Utah. (R- 2) 
5. Prior to the contract and after the contract was 
entered into, Ehman and Plastic World made telephone calls back 
and forth. On several occasions the president of Ehman made 
trips to Salt Lake City, Utah from Evanston to inspect the 
work and to make arrangements for the repairs on the molds which 
were shipped from Evanston, Wyoming to Salt Lake City, Utah for 
the repairs. (Affidavit of Ehman, R- 16) 
6. Ehman supplied no services or labor to Plastic 
World, all services and labor being supplied by Plastic 
World to Ehman. (Affidavit of Ehman, R- 16) 
7. A dispute as to the quality of the work on the 
molds arose and Plastic World brought this action against 
Ehman in Salt Lake County, Utah to collect what it alleged was 
due on the oral contract. 
8. Summons and complaint were served in Wyoming upon 
Ehman. 
9. The complaint does not contain any allegations 
that predicates jurisdiction upon the Utah long-arm statute, 
Utah Code Ann. 78-27-22, et.seq., nor does the complaint 
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allege that Ehman contracted to deliver goods or services 
within the State of Utah or that Ehman is or was doing business 
in Utah, or any other allegation to establish jurisdiction. (R- 16) 
10. Ehman filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 12 (b), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, on jurisdictional grounds, which 
motion was denied by the Court. (R- 25) 
11. From this Order denying Ehman's motion to dismiss, 
Ehman filed a motion with the Utah Court of Appeals to allow it 
to file an interlocutory appeal in this matter, which motion was 
granted by the Court. (R-40) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
DUE PROCESS OF LAW REQUIRES 
THAT A DEFENDANT BE SUED IN 
HIS HOME STATE UNLESS HE HAS 
ENGAGED IN BUSINESS OR OTHER 
ACTIVITY IN A SISTER STATE WHICH 
WOULD INVOKE JURISDICTION OVER 
HIM 
The question of jurisdiction over non-residents 
has provided a great amount of appellate time and effort 
over the years and the guidelines of when will jurisdiction 
vest have now been quite clearly drawn. 
The several states of the union have invoked what 
are commonly called long-arm statutes as a means of granting 
to their respective courts jurisdiction over persons from 
sister states who are carrying on business within that state 
or whose contacts or activities are such that jurisiction of 
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that state will attach under the long-arm statutes. 
The hallmark case of International Shoe Co. v. Brown 
(1945) 326 US 310, 90 L. Ed 95, 66 S Ct 154 established certain 
guidelines for claiming jurisdiction over a non resident. 
Early on the courts focused upon the standard 
of "doing business" within the state as a means of attaching 
jurisdiction, but as time progressed a new standard of "minimal 
contacts" arose. Hanson v. Denckla, (1953) 375 US 235, 2 L Ed 2d 
1283,78 S Ct 1228. Utah adheres to the "significant minimal 
contacts" rule. Kocha v. Gibson Products Co., 535 P. 2d 680 
(Utah 1975) 
The Utah Court recognized that there is a 
distinction between "doing business" and "minimal contacts" and 
in the case of Mallory Engineering v. Ted R. Brown & Associates, 
618 P.2d 1004 (Utah 1980) pointed out that there is a 
significant difference between the two concepts. The difference 
is that "doing business" covers a general type of jurisdiction 
while "minimal contacts" bestows a special jurisdiction which 
must hinge on the long arm statutes requirements. The Court at 
footnote 4 observed: 
"Conversely, if the activities of the 
defendant are limited in nature or 
transitory in duration, the courts may 
assume jurisdiction over that person 
only in relation to causes of action 
related to the activity of the 
defendant in the state. To assume this 
"special" jurisdiction, the courts must 
employ the Long Arm Statute." (Citing 
authority) 
(Emphasis mine) 
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Reference must be made to the long-arm statute to 
ascertain what is general and what is special. 
Utah Code Ann 78-27-24 sets out seven (7) criteria, 
however in Mallory Engineering, the Court deemed the first 
criteria (doing business within the state) as being in the 
general category. 
Under the facts of this case now before the Court 
of Appeals the only relevant criteria is number two (2) 
which reads: 
" (2) contracting to supply services or 
goods in this state.11 
Actually under the facts of this case this criteria is not 
applicable, but it is the only one that the Trial Court could 
possibly, under the facts, attempt to find jurisdiction. 
Why this is not applicable is that the defendant did 
not contract to supply service or goods in this state. It 
allegedly contracted for services or goods in this state. 
Plaintiff's complaint is silent as to just what 
it is predicating its theory of jurisdiction on, which is its 
burden to affirmatively show. Union Ski Company v. Union 
Plastics Corp., 548 P.2d 1257 (Utah 1976). This brief, of 
necessity, must attempt to ferret out any theory upon which 
jurisdiction would lie based upon the case law and statutory 
provisions of Utah law. 
No allegation is made in the complaint that the 
transaction between plaintiff and defendant was more than 
a one time matter. Assuming that it was a one time 
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transaction, then the case of Dahnken, Inc. v. Marshinsky, 580 
P. 2d 596 (Utah 1978) would seem to be applicable, wherein 
it was held that the District Court had no jurisdiction over 
a Wyoming resident for a single transaction of buying a 
ring in Utah in an action brought by the store to set aside 
the transaction on the grounds of mistake. 
Even assuming a series of phone calls and visits to 
Utah, and even the shipment of goods out of Utah, this is not 
sufficient to establish a presence in Utah to envoke 
jurisdiction. For cases, factually, pointing this out, See: 
Cate Rental Company, Inc. v. Whalen & Company, 549 P.2d 707 
(Utah 1976); Union Ski Co. v. Union Plastics Company, 548 P.2d 
1257 (Utah 1976) . See also: White v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 
549 P.2d 439 (Utah 1976) and cases cited at footnote 1 
thereof. 
It is submitted that the Court can only look to the 
allegations of the complaint or any affidavits filed to 
determine if jurisdiction will lie. Roskelley & Co. v. Lerco, 
Inc., 610 P.2d 1307 (Utah 1980). 
The affidavit of the defendant's president, which was 
unchallenged by the plaintiff, Kocha, (supra) clearly showed 
that defendant was not doing business in Utah and that this 
was a one time transaction. Had the complaint alleged factual 
jurisdictional matters the Trial Court could have followed 
Roskelley with respect to affidavits or examined into the 
facts as in Mallory Engineering. 
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In Synergetics v. Marathon Ranching Co., Ltd., 
701 P.2d 1106 (Utah 1985) the Utah Supreme Court pointed out 
that due process requires that "before a court can exercise 
specific personal jurisdiction" over a resident of another 
state there must be minimal contacts of such a magnitude that 
the traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice 
are observed and that the defendant's contacts are such that 
he could reasonably anticipate being "haled into Court" in 
Utah. In Mallory, the court used the word "special" 
jurisdiction while in Synergetics the court used the word 
"specific", but it is submitted that there is little or no 
practical difference. 
POINT TWO 
DEFENDANT'S CONTACTS IN UTAH 
DID NOT REACH THE LEVEL OF A 
MINIMAL CONTACT UNDER THE 
LONG-ARM STATUTE 
The Supreme Court of the United States has laid down 
guidelines on the question of minimal contacts. In the case 
of Helicopteros Nactionales de Columbia v. Hall, (1984) 466 US 
408, 80 L. Ed 2d 404, 104 S. Ct 1868, the Court reaffirmed 
several earlier cases which predated the International Shoe 
case, but which the Supreme Court said were still applicable 
in determining due process and jurisdiction over non 
residents. The facts of Helicopteros, were that a foreign 
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corporation negotiated through its president for the purchase 
of helicopters from Bell Helicopter Corporation, the 
negotiations having taken place in Texas. After the purchase 
contract was entered into, in Texas, personnel from the 
purchaser traveled to Texas for instruction on the maintenance 
of the helicopters, payments were made in Texas on the 
aircraft but drawn on foreign banks. A suit was brought in 
Texas against Helicopteros and upon appeal to the Supreme 
Court of the United States the court ruled that there were 
insufficient contacts to establish the requirements of due 
process under the 14th Amendment. 
The Supreme Court cited the case of Rosenberg Bros. 
& Co. v. Curtis Brown, (1923) 260 US 516, 67 L. Ed 372, 43 S 
Ct 170, and reaffirmed its holdings. In this case, a man 
operating a clothing store in Oklahoma would journey to New 
York annually to purchase clothing for the next year's 
business, would have the clothing shipped to him in Oklahoma 
and would send the necessary purchase monies to New York. 
The Court in this case established that there must be 
"continuous and systematic" contacts, but that purchases 
and frequent trips to accomplish the purchases, standing alone 
were insufficient for a state to assert its jurisdiction over 
the individual. See Also: Kulko v. California Superior 
Court, (1978) 436 US 93, 56 L Ed 2d 132, 98 S Ct 1690. 
The affidavit of the defendant's president refutes 
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any allegation of doing business, although not plead, and 
also refutes any minimal contacts necessary to impute 
jurisdiction. 
Utah has never answered the question of ordering and 
purchasing supplies or work to be performed for someone 
outside of the state, although the Statute and cases decided 
under the statute clearly show that if one contracts to 
deliver work or services in the state, jurisdiction will 
attach. Synergetics v. Marathon Ranching Co., (supra); Mallory 
Engineering Co v. Ted R. Brown & Associates, (supra). 
As this statute states what it does and as this 
statute has been on the books of the laws of Utah since 
1969 (L. 1969, Ch 246, § 3) and was amended in 1983 (1983, 
Ch 160, § 1) and again in 1987 (1987, Ch. 35, § 1) it 
hardly can be said that the legislature has not had an 
opportunity to amend the statute had it seen fit to do 
so. It is a rule of Utah that where the legislature has 
amended a portion of a statute but left the rest in tact, 
absent substantial evidence to the contrary, the legislature 
is presumed to be satisfied with the unaltered portions of 
the statute and the court decisions based thereon. 
American Coal Co. v. Sandstrom, 689 P.2d 1 (Utah 1984). 
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POINT THREE 
THE FILING OF A MOTION TO 
DISMISS UNDER RULE 12 (b) 
IS NOT A GENERAL APPEARANCE 
Ehmanfs motion to dismiss was framed under Rule 
12(b), Utah Rules of Civl Procedure based upon the lack of 
jurisdiction of the trial court. 
Such a motion is not a general appearance. Ted R. 
Brown and Associates, Inc. v. Carnes Corp. 547 P.2d 206 
(Utah 1976) ; Mallory Engineering v. Ted R. Brown and 
Associates, (supra.). 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court 
erred in not granting the motion to dismiss plaintiff's 
complaint on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction. 
Substantial minimal contacts were neither plead nor 
shown by affidavit. 
Doing business in Utah was not plead nor shown by 
affidavit. 
Conversely, the affidavit of Ehman's president, 
affirmatively showed that the contacts with Utah were not 
substantial or systamatic and that Ehman did not do business 
within the State of Utah under the guidelines of the cases 
heretofore decided on the subject. 
It is respectfully submitted that the Court of 
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Appeals should reverse the order of Judge Hutchings, remand 
the matter back with instructions to enter an order dismissing 
plaintiff's complaint and awarding Ehman its costs. 
ULLY SUBMITTED, 
PAUL N. COTRO-MANES 
Attorney for Appellant 
Suite 280, 311 South State 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
th 
This is to certify that on the &i6~* day of 
October, 1988, the undersigned caused three copies of the 
foregoing Brief to be served upon the plaintiff by depositing 
the same into the United States Mails, postage prepaid and 
addressed to: 
Les F. England, Esq. 
Attorney at Law 
3760 Highland Drive, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
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ADDENDA 
Order Denying Motion to Dismiss 
Utah Code Annotated 78-27-22 
Utah Code Annotated 78-27-24 
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LES F. ENGLAND (#3646) 
3760 Highland Drive, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Telephone: (801) 278-7755 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
—ooOoo— 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
PLASTIC WORLD, INC. * 
* 
Plaintiffs, ORDER 
vs. * 
EHMAN ENGINEERING, INC., * 
Case No. 883 2558 CV 
Defendants. * Judge Hutchings 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss came on for hearing before the 
Honorable Judge McCleave on April 13, 1988 at the hour of 1:30 
p.m. Judge McCleave ordered that the matter be transferred to 
Judge Hutchings. Upon stipulation and consent of counsel for 
both parties the matter was submitted to Judge Hutchings on 
pleadings and memorandum with a waiver of oral argument. 
Based upon the pleadings, memorandum and affidavits in the 
file, it is hereby, 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss is denied, and defendant shall have 10 days from the date 
hereof to file an appropriate answer to plaintiff's complaint. 
DATED this 3_2 daY o f Ap»*l, 1988. 
£ 
-A 
lefe M 
Judge Michael Hutchings 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
~%~ 
I hereby certify that on the /7 day of April, 1988, I 
caused to be mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, 
postage prepaid to the following: 
Mr. Paul Cotro-Manes 
Suite 280, 311 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Please take notice that this service is made pursuant to 
Rule 2.9, Rules of Practice in Circuit Courts, State of Utah and 
that if there are any objections to said order the same must be 
filed five days after service. The Order shall be submitted to 
the Court for signature and entry after said period of time 
without further notice. 
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78-27-22, Jurisdiction over nonresidents — Purpose of 
provision. 
It is declared, as a matter of legislative determination, that the public 
interest demands the state provide its citizens with an effective means of 
redress against nonresident persons, who, through certain significant mini-
mal contacts with this state, incur obligations to citizens entitled to the state's 
protection. This legislative action is deemed necessary because of technologi-
cal progress which has substantially increased the flow of commerce between 
the several states resulting in increased interaction between persons of this 
state and persons of other states. 
The provisions of this act, to ensure maximum protection to citizens of this 
state, should be applied so as to assert jurisdiction over nonresident defen-
dants to the fullest extent permitted by the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
78-27-24. Jurisdiction over nonresidents — Acts submit-
ting person to jurisdiction. 
Any person, notwithstanding § 16-10-102, whether or not a citizen or resi-
dent of this state, who in person or through an agent does any of the following 
enumerated acts, submits himself, and if an individual, his personal represen-
tative, to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to any claim arising 
from: 
(1) the transaction of any business within this state; 
(2) contracting to supply services or goods in this state; 
(3) the causing of any injury within this state whether tortious or by 
breach of warranty; 
(4) the ownership, use, or possession of any real estate situated in this 
state; 
(5) contracting to insure any person, property, or risk located within 
this state at the time of contracting; 
(6) with respect to actions of divorce, separate maintenance, or child 
support, having resided, in the marital relationship, within this state 
notwithstanding subsequent departure from the state; or the commission 
in this state of the act giving rise to the claim, so long as that act is not a 
mere omission, failure to act, or occurrence over which the defendent had 
no control; or 
(7) the commission of sexual intercourse within this state which gives 
rise to a paternity suit under Chapter 45a, Title 78, to determine pater-
nity for the purpose of establishing responsibility for child support. 
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